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NOTES AND COMMENT
terstate commerce, is within the purview of the "Interstate Commerce"
clause. It is submitted that 7 (a) will be upheld by the Supreme
Court in conformity with the liberal trend and loose construction
of the Federal Constitution as displayed in upholding other New Deal
legislation.3 9 The Nields opinion 40 doubtless will encourage un-
friendly companies to continue their defiance of the law; the national
welfare requires that the Supreme Court act promptly in deciding
the constitutionality of 7 (a).
IRVING L. KALISH.
WARRANTIES-CONSULTATIONS-EVIDENCE-IN INSURANCE.'
The term warranty as used in insurance law seems to be the
brain child of the market place, foisted upon the courts by "stam-
mering for a word" lawyers, applied loosely by judges until it se-
cured such a firm grasp upon the terminology of insurance law that
it is universally employed and as widely undefined.2 A warranty
is a term of the insurance contract, similar to a condition precedent,
providing that a fact exists or will exist, which partly forms the in-
ducement and consideration of the insurer's promise to assume the
risk.3
In the early days of insurance, marine being the first kind known
to the law, the assured was bound to comply strictly with the terms
of his warranties.4  The theory was as follows: the underwriter was
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505 (1934) ; Perry v.
United States, - U. S. -, 55 Sup. Ct. 432 (1935); Norman v. Baltimore &
0. R. IL Co., - U. S. -, 55 Sup. Ct. 407 (1935); Nortz v. United States,
- U. S. -, 55 Sup. Ct. 428 (1935).
o Supra note 35.
See (1931) 6 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 91.
2Patterson, Warranties in Insurance (1934) 34 CoL L. REv. 602, "A
warranty in insurance law is (1) a term of an insurance contract (2) which
prescribes, as a condition of the insurer's promise, (3) a fact, the presence of
which, regarded as of the time of contracting, will or may render less probable
than its absence the occurrence of the insured event." RICHARDS ON INSURANCE
(4th ed. 1932) §86; DONAHUE, OUTLINE OF INSURANCE (1st ed. 1927) 20
(defines by showing effect of); MAY, INSURANCE §151 and BLISS, LiFE
INSURANcE §34 (a warranty is a condition precedent) ; Kasprzyh v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 79 Misc. 263, 140 N. Y. Supp. 211 (1913).
'The first reported insurance case is Dowdale's case, 6 Coke R. 476
(1589). In 1601 a special tribunal for the trial of marine insurance cases was
established in England. In 1756 Lord Mansfield was appointed Chief Justice-
of the Court of King's Bench. He is accepted as the father of insurance law.
RICHARDS ON INSURANCE §9.
' This, generally, is still the law in New York. Chase v. Hamilton, 20
N. Y. 52 (1859); Alexander v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 66 N. Y. 464 (1876);
American Surety Co. v. Patriotic Assurance Co., 242 N. Y. 54, 150 N. E. 599
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at the mercy of the insured for a description of the subject and the
proposed voyage.5
The breach of an express warranty, whether material to the risk
or not, whether the loss happens through the breach or not, absolutely
determines the policy and the assured forfeits his rights thereunder.
6
Motive, honest belief, good faith of the assured are all irrelevant if
it is shown a warranty has been breached.
7
Richards 8 defines a representation as a statement made by or
on behalf of a person desiring to enter into a contract of insurance
with the intention that it shall come to the notice of the underwriter;
and which relates, by way of affirmation, denial or description, to a
fact, circumstance, or past event and tends to influence the under-
writer's estimate of the character and degree of the risk to be insured
against.9
A misrepresentation 10 of a material fact has the same effect as
a breach of warranty or a concealment of a material fact-it renders
the contract voidable at the option of the insurer. Fraud need not
(1926); Shuster v. Nat. Surety Co., 256 N. Y. 150, 175 N. E. 655 (1931);
Graley v. American Eagle, 235 App. Div. 490, 257 N. Y. Supp. 64 (4th Dept.
1934); Goldstein v. Nat. Liberty Ins. Co., 134 Misc. 90, 234 N. Y. Supp. 40
(1928); Justry v. Northern Ins. Co., 151 Misc. 757, 273 N. Y. Supp. 64
(1934).
RICHARDS ON INSURANCE §90. This theory is still applied to differ marine
from life and fire insurance, infra note 16.
'Bank of Ballston v. Ins. Co. of North America, 50 N. Y. 45 (1872);
Fitch v. American Life Ins. Co., 59 N. Y. 557 (1875); Cushman v. U. S.
Life, 63 N. Y. 404 (1875) ; Barteau v. Phoenix, 67 N. Y. 595 (1876) ; Cogswell
v. Chubb, 1 App. Div. 93, 36 N. Y. Supp. 1076 (1st Dept. 1896), aff'd on
opinion, 157 N. Y. 709, 53 N. E. 1124 (1898).
1 Gaines v. Fidelity, 188 N. Y. 411, 415, 81 N. E. 169 (1907). * * * One
of the very objects of the warranty is to preclude all controversy about the
materiality or immateriality of the statement"; Le Roy v. Market, 45 N. Y.
80 (1871); Foot v. Aetna, 61 N. Y. 571 (1875); Dwight v. Germania Life
Ins. Co., 103 N. Y. 341, 8 N. E. 654 (1886); Allen v. German-American Co.,
123 N. Y. 6, 25 N. E. 309 (1890); Clemens v. Supreme Assembly, 131 N. Y.
485, 30 N. E. 496 (1892) ; Eastern District Dye Works v. Traveler's Ins. Co.,
234 N. Y. 441, 138 N. E. 401 (1923); Hook v. Michigan Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
44 Misc. 478, 90 N. Y. Supp. 56 (1904); Woehrle v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 21 Misc. 88, 46 N. Y. Supp. 862 (1897).
1 RICHARDS ON INSURANCE §81.
'For substantially the same definition in fewer words see CADY ON
INSURANCE §45; Armour v. Transatlantic, 90 N. Y. 450 (1882).
"*If statements are oral or in collateral documents there is an inference
they are representations. Jefferson v. Cotheal, 7 Wend. 72 (N. Y. 1831).
If in the policy the inference is they are warranties. Ripley v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 30 N. Y. 136 (1864) ; Moore v. Prudential, 170 App. Div. 849,
156 N. Y. Supp. 892 (3d Dept. 1916).If a doubt arises the courts endeavor to construe it as a representation,
infra note 19.
A warranty must be complied with strictly, su~pra note 4.
A representation if substantially true will not affect the contract. O'Con-
nor Co. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 198 App. Div. 136, 189 N. Y. Supp. 612 (4th
Dept. 1922), aff'd, 233 N. Y. 659, 135 N. E. 959 (1922).
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be shown. An immaierial misrepresentation will not affect the con-
tract unless it was made fraudulently with actual intent to mislead.11
A concealment is the designed and intentional withholding of
any fact material to the risk which assured, in honesty and good
faith, ought to communicate to the underwriter.1 2 A concealment of
a material fact avoids the policy.13 The question of materiality is
ordinarily for the jury.14  If insurer with full knowledge of the
facts would have refused the risk the concealment is material. 15 In
marine insurance intent to withhold is not necessary-the rule is
"utmost good faith." In fire and life insurance the rule is "good
faith and fair dealing." 10 A fact may be material, yet no duty to
disclose exists because the facts are as readily ascertainable by the
insurer.17
To avoid the harsh and often unjust results of an immaterial
breach of contract which would impose upon the assured the bur-
dens of a warranty, the strong inclination was to make the statements
of the insured binding only when they were material to the risk
where this could be done without running counter to the clear and
unambiguous intent of the parties. In conformity with such atti-
tude, the following rules of construction have been developed: '8
1. All doubts will be resolved in favor of the insured.19 2. Expres-
sions of opinion, expectation and belief will be construed as repre-
sentations.20 3. Statement of present use is not a warranty of con-
tinuance.21 4. To avoid forfeiture the contract will be deemed
severable.22  5. Burden of pleading and proof of breach is on in-
"Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics Savings Bank & Trust Co., 72
Fed. 413 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896).
"Daniels v. Hudson River Fire Ins. Co., 12 Cush. 416 (Mass. 1853);
Rauls v. Ins. Co., 27 N. Y. 282 (1863); Sebring v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins.
Co., 255 N. Y. 382, 174 N. E. 761 (1931); RicHARDs ON INSURANCE §78.
"Sun Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ocean Ins. Co., 107 U. S. 485, 1 Sup. Ct. 582(1882) ; Merchants Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 219 App. Div. 636, 220 N. Y.
Supp. 514 (1st Dept. 1927), aff'd, 246 N. Y. 616, 159 N. E. 674 (1928).
" Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics Savings Bank & Trust Co., supra
note 11.
'In life insurance the effect depends on the belief of the insured as to the
materiality of the fact withheld. Mallory v. Travelers Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 52(1871).
" Sebring v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., supra note 12.
'Gates v. Madison, 5 N. Y. 469 (1851); Kernochon v. N. Y. Bowery,
17 N. Y. 428 (1858); Vallon v. National Fund Assurance Co., 20 N. Y. 32(1859); Smith v. Countryman, 30 N. Y. 655 (1864); Mallory v. Travelers
Ins. Co., stpra note 15; Clarkson v. Western Assurance Co., 33 App. Div. 23,
53 N. Y. Supp. 508 (4th Dept. 1898); Amer. Artistic v. Glens Falls, 1 Misc.
118, 20 N. Y. Supp. 646 (1892).
"RICHARDS ON IN SURANCE §§93-97.
"Fitch v. American Life Ins. Co., supra note 6; Burleigh v. Gebbord Fire
Ins. Co., 90 N. Y. 220 (1882); Jennings v. Supreme Council, 81 App. Div. 76,
81 N. Y. Supp. 90 (1st Dept. 1903).
- Hadcock v. Osmer, 153 N. Y. 604, 47 N. E. 923 (1897).
'Smith v. Mechanics Fire Ins. Co., 32 N. Y. 399 (1865).
"Donnelly v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 184 N. Y. 107, 76 N. E. 914 (1906).
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surer as differentiated from pleading and proving a condition prece-
dent generally.2 3 6. Questions unanswered or questions not answered
untruthfully are construed in favor of insured.2 4
There is a tendency to accept substantial compliance with a war-
ranty as a substitute for the rule of strict compliance. This rule
is more prevalent in fire than any other form of insurance.2 5
The reasons for the establishment of the above rules prompted
the legislature in 1907 to relieve the insured from the burdens of a
breach of warranty in life insurance by the enactment of Section 58,
N. Y. Insurance Law.2 6 To create a warranty in the policy under
this section the element of fraud must be present. 27 All parts of
the contract must be in writing and physically attached to the policy.2 8
Dilleber v. Home Life Ins. Co. 2 9 was decided at a time when
the social and economic uses of life insurance were not safeguarded
by Section 58, N. Y. Insurance Law. In that case the answers in
the application were warranted to be full, correct and true. When
asked the following questions: 1. "Has the party had, during the
last 10 years, any sickness or disease?" 2. "Have you employed or
consulted any physician?".the insured answered: 1. "Nine years ago
had an attack of typhoid fever." 2. "Dr. Paine, nine years ago:
He is now dead."
On the trial it appeared that the insured did not mention an at-
tack of spitting blood. The court held the answer was true as far
Slocovitch v. Orient Mut. Ins. Co., 108 N. Y. 56, 14 N. E. 802 (1888).
2 Cushman v. U. S. Life, supra note 6; Dilleber v. Home Ins. Life Co.,
69 N. Y. 256 (1877) ; Higgins v. Phoenix Mut. Ins. Co., 74 N. Y. 6 (1878).
5Patterson, Warranties in Insurance (1934) 34 COL. L. lZv. 596, 624;
Licht v. N. Y. Indemnity Co., 250 N. Y. 211, 164 N. E. 910 (1928); Weingold
v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 250 N. Y. 533, 166 N. E. 313 (1928);
Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Hamilton Fire Insurance Co., 251 N. Y. 98, 167 N. E.
184 (1929); Miller v. Amer. Eagle, 253 N. Y. 64, 179 N. E. 495 (1930).
26 N. Y. INSURANCE LAW §58. "Every policy of insurance issued or deliv-
ered within the state * * * shall contain the entire contract between the
parties and nothing shall be incorporated therein * * * unless * * * indorsed
upon or attached to the policy when issued; and all statements purporting to
be made by the insured shall in the absence of fraud be deemed representations
and not warranties. Any waiver of the provisions of this section shall be
void."
' Eastern District Dye Works v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 234 N. Y. 441, 138
N. E. 401 (1923). "The result of this provision is that in order to produce a
warranty * * *, the statement * * * must be characterized by and include the
element of fraud. * * * A misstatement even though stated in the form of a
warranty, if made in good faith and without this element of fraud passed into
the same class as an ordinary representation and became a defense only if it
was material. On the other hand the effect of a misrepresentation was left
unchanged by the statute. If material it constituted a defense although made
innocently and without any feature of fraud; it was sufficient that it was
material as an inducement for the issue of the policy and was untrue."
' Archer v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 218 N. Y. 18, 112 N. E. 433
(1916); Acee v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 219 App. Div. 246, 219 N. Y.
Supp. 152 (4th Dept. 1927).
' Supra note 24.
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as it went and was not a breach of warranty as matter of law. At
page 262 the court said:
"The answers were literally true. * * * It was full and com-
plete as far as it went. If a question is not answered there
is no warranty that there is nothing to answer. And, so, in
a case of partial answer, the warranty cannot be extended
beyond the answer * * * breach of warranty must be based
upon the affirmation of something not true."
It was a question for the jury whether a portion of the truth
was fraudulently and intentionally suppressed or withheld.
In the Cushman case 30 the question asked was, "Have you ever
had a disease of the liver?" It was answered "No." The evidence
showed he had an attack of congestion of the liver, had been attended
by a physician for six days. It was decided that congestion of the
liver was not necessarily, within the meaning of the policy, a disease
of the liver. The jury, as they are wont to, having found for the
plaintiff, the judgment was affirmed.
In these cases we find excellent examples of the strained con-
struction placed upon the policies before the enactment of Section 58.
The courts went a long way to find for the plaintiffs, but these cases
have been overruled by Anderson v. Aetna 31 and Travelers v.
PomerantZ.
3 2
This brings us to a consideration of the Anderson case. The
plaintiff sues to recover on life insurance policies. The assured in
his application was asked: 9. "Have you consulted a physician * * *
for or suffered from any ailment or disease of: * * * C. Stomach,
intestines, liver, kidneys or bladder? * * * F. Any other disease or
illness or any injury not mentioned above?"
To all of these questions the applicant answered "No," except
to 9F which he answered as follows: "Yes. Name of disease,
pneumonia. Number of attacks, 1. Began February, 1929. Recov-
ered April 1929. Results (if within five years name and address of
every physician consulted), complete recovery. Dr. Hague, Roches-
ter, N. Y."
The rule in the Dilleber case, if applied to these questions and
answers, would hold no breach of warranty. The Court of Appeals
said, in the Anderson case:
"The holding of the Dilleber case that there was no breach
of warranty, because the answer was true as far as it went
no longer carries any legal consequences."
Ibid.
265 N. Y. 376, 193 N. E. 181 (1934); see also Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Mechanics Savings Bank & Trust Co., supra note 11.
246 N. Y. 63, 158 N. E. 21 (1927).
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On the trial it appeared by uncontradicted evidence that insured
was treated by a physician in his professional capacity, and that an
X-ray examination was ordered. The court in holding that this was
a consultation as a matter of law said, at page 380:
"Cases calling for an X-ray examination can scarcely be pre-
sumed to be mere temporary disorders, having no bearing upon
general health. The inquiry was not to be passed over as
trivial. It was made material to the risk."
The contention of the plaintiff that the jury should be allowed
to consider whether or not he had consulted the physicians without
being ill or without being treated was said by Pound, C. I., to be
fanciful.
In the Nowak case 33 it was shown that the insured was at-
tended by a physician in her professional capacity, that the insured
consulted with her, that the insured was ill, and that the physician
treated the insured. The Court held that this was not sufficient to
permit a finding of "consultation" as matter of law. The Court
said the assured may have talked only concerning the weather, or
may have gossiped about her neighbors without more. We have the
Court of Appeals saying in 1930 the insured "may have gossiped";
in 1934 saying it would be fanciful to consider whether or not the
insured was ill. No argument is necessary to show the dicta in the
Nowak case is just that.
It seems to be a question of degree whether the evidence adduced
upon a trial establishes a consultation as a matter of law.34  Some-
where between these cases lies the dividing line. It is respectfully
submitted it will be found in closer proximity to the Nowak case
than to the Anderson case.
The existence of the privilege of communications between physi-
cian and patient 35 makes it a practical impossibility for the insurer
to sustain the burden of proving a breach of warranty or misrepre-
sentation of a material fact in life insurance unless the insured waives
the statute.36 Within the statute the insurer may prove a misrepre-
sentation,37 but it can not prove the materiality without the consent
of the insured.
'Nowak v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 252 N. Y. 465, 169 N. E.
647 (1930).Travelers v. Pomerantz, miwpra note 32; Minsker v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 254 N. Y. 333, 173 N. E. 4 (1930) ; Jenkins v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 257 N. Y. 289, 178 N. E. 9 (1931) ; Saad v. N. Y. Life, 201
App. Div. 544, 194 N. Y. Supp. 445 (1st Dept. 1922), aff'd, 235 N. Y. 550, 139
N. E. 730 (1923).
N. Y. CIVIL PRACTICE ACT §352.
"6 ST. JOHN'S L. REV., supra note 1.
P* Fatten v. United Life & Accident Insurance Ass'n, 133 N. Y. 450, 31
N. E. 342 (1892).
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Although the courts have not said the burden is on the insured
to prove the performance of conditions precedent or the truth of his
material representations, they have placed upon him the duty of going
forward with the proof after the insurer has given evidence of a
breach of a representation. The recent decisions have achieved
that result.38
Not being able to waive the physician's immunity, the beneficiary
in life policies often finds it hard to overcome the prima facie case
which the insurer is allowed to prove without overstepping the bounds
of privilege. The result of this is, in many cases, the obstruction of
justice and a concealment of the facts.39 The legislature by allowing
such beneficiaries the right to waive the privilege would overcome
this defect.
LEO F. BOLAND.
AUTOMOBILES-MANSLAUGHTER IN FIRST DEGREE-INTOXICATED
DRIVER.
Manslaughter is defined as homicide not amounting to murder
in the first or second degree, or justified or excusable homicide.' It
is specifically defined in its most common form by Section 1050, Sub-
division 1, of the New York Penal Law as homicide committed with-
out a design to effect death while engaged in committing or attempting
to commit a misdemeanor affecting the person or property either of
the person killed or of another.2
sSupra note 34.
(1933) 12 ORE. L. RFv. 216, quotes from a letter from Professor Wig-
more on the subject of privilege:
"For two centuries it has been settled in the law of evidence that
confidential communications as such are not entitled to any brivilege.
The administration of justice must get at the facts of the controversy,
or else it is blocked. Any privilege is a distinct exception. The privilege
that was established some years ago in many states for communications
between medical men and patients has proved to be nothing but an
obstruction of justice; it obstructs the ascertainment of facts in insur-
ance cases and in personal injury cases and in most instances its appli-
cation makes a laughing stock of the law of evidence; nor was itjustified by any necessity."
IN. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) §1049.
2People v. Koerber, 244 N. Y. 147, 155 N. E. 79 (1926) ; People v. Dar-
ragh, 141 App. Div. 408, 126 N. Y. Supp. 522 (1st Dept. 1910), aff'd, 203 N. Y.
527, 96 N. E. 1124 (1911); People v. Stacy, 119 App. Div. 743, 104 N. Y.
Supp. 615 (3d Dept. 1907), aff'd, 192 N. Y. 577, 85 N. E. 1112 (1908) ; People
v. Harris, 74 Misc. 353, 134 N. Y. Supp. 409 (1911); People v. McKeon, 31
Hun 449 (N. Y. 1884).
